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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP MEDIA RELEASES 
NEPAL: RESPONDING TO THE RoYAL C ouP 
Kathmandu/Brussels. February 24, 2005 
King Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of democratic 
party leaders on l February 2005 will likely aid the Maoist 
insurgency and intensify the civil war. But by bringing the 
crisis to a head he has created an opportunity for diplomatic 
efforts to pull Nepal back from the brink of collapse and 
develop an effective counter-insurgency strategy. The key 
countries and organisations involved in the country-
India, the U.S., the UK and the UN- need to work together 
to strengthen a collapsing state and establish a plan to deal 
with the Maoist insurgency. Acceptance of the · coup and 
lack of action would only increase the chances of a Maoist 
victory and a descent into worse violence. 
There is also an urgent human rights crisis in Nepal that 
requires international action. The record on disappearances 
and extra-judicial killings is one of the world's worst. Hun-
dreds of political figures and activists have been detained, 
and protests have been violently suppressed. An expanded 
campaign against the Maoists by the Royal Nepalese Army 
(RNA) is likely to result in worsening abuses while offering 
no realistic chance of defeating the insurgency or reaching 
a negotiated solution. At the same time, the government is 
vulnerable to external pressure because it is heavily depen-
dent on foreign aid. 
The policy priorities should be: 
•re-establishment of constitutional rule, including resto-
ration of all suspended freedoms, release of all people ar-
rested in the royal crackdown since l February 2005 and 
revocation of the state of emergency; 
•expanded protection of human rights, including through 
full and immediate access to all places of detention for the 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
•a stronger legal framework to protect rights, including 
through repeal of the Terrorism and Destructive Activities 
Ordinance (TADO); 
•re-establishment of democratic institutions and strength-
ening of the state's administrative and governance capacity 
across the country; and 
•a broad-based political , security and socio-economic 
strategy to address not only the insurgency but also the un-
derlying issues that have fuelled it. 
To achieve these, donors should immediately implement a 
range of measures to pressure the royal government. Instead 
of vague threats, they should take the following steps at once 
and only lift them when specific conditions are met: 
•suspend all military assistance that is not essential to 
maintaining the security status quo; 
• suspend all direct bilateral and multilateral budgetary 
support to the government; 
•initiate a review of all current development assistance 
and prepare plans for phased suspension and withdrawal 
of these programs; 
•signal displeasure with the l<ing's action by diplomatic 
and protocol means (including cancellation of visits and 
invitations); and 
•support a strong resolution on human rights at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 2005. 
he best mechanism to coordinate this would be a Con-
tact Group bringing together the major powers and institu-
tions that have been active in developing a policy towards 
Nepal's conflict. This group might in turn appoint a special 
envoy to advance its agreed political response to the coup 
and the insurgency. It vvill not be easy to achieve all policy 
objectives but a demonstrably united international front 
would demand attention in Kathmandu and be able to send 
a strong message to all involved that political institutions 
must be rebuilt if the state is to survive the insurgency. If 
the country's main political forces cannot agree on a com-
mon agenda, they all stand to lose. 
The Contact Group and other donors should make clear 
that they expect the measures demanded to be taken im-
mediately and to be sustained. The royal government must 
be judged on its actions rather than its public pronounce-
ments . If the initial round of pressure does not achieve re-
sults, and the king is still unwilling to relinquish absolute 
power, donors should consider: 
•suspending all military aid, including provision of spare 
parts for vehicles and helicopters and aviation fuel; 
•suspending all assistance (including development assis-
tance) apart from humanitarian aid; 
•introducing targeted sanctions including a freeze of the 
assets of the royal family, senior officials, military officers and 
their families, visa bans and suspension of the RNA's lucra-
tive involvement in UN peacekeeping operations; and 
•encouraging the Security Council to investigate and pros-
ecute both government and Maoist suspects who have es-
caped justice due to Nepal's inadequate judicial procedures. 
Should the king still drag his feet, it would be time to 
consider more radical options, including international 
expressions of support for a republic rather than constitu-
tional monarchy. Gyanendra may well have tipped support 
within the country decisively toward a republic already but 
he should be offered one last chance to agree to policies that 
would allow the Nepali state to respond effectively to the 
Maoist challenge. If he continues on his present course, his 
coup will mark a stage leading to intensified conflict and 
possibly a Maoist victory. 
Asia Briefing N°36 Reprinted by Permission from 
International Crisis Group 
For more details on the coup see Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°9l, Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation 'Norse, 9 
NEPAL: HoLD THE KING TO H 1s PROMISES 
February 2005. 
Website: www.crisisgroup.org 
Brussels, 9 May 2005: King Gyanendra's self imposed 100-
day deadline to restore order and lay out a road map for 
democracy and peace in Nepal will pass on 11 May, with only 
limited progress towards these aims. As the conflict with the 
Maoists continues to worsen, the International Crisis Group 
urges the international community to take concerted action 
to help turn the situation around. 
In a letter (full text below) addressed to UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Indian 
External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, and UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, Crisis Group calls for the establishment 
of a contact group to negotiate a return to democracy, the 
maintenance of restrictions on military aid to Nepal until 
democracy has been restored, and full international support 
for the monitoring mission by the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights . 
Since the King's 1 February coup, the intensification of the 
conflict has been dramatic, with at least 655 people killed in 
the last three months. State Security forces were responsible 
for at least 530 of those deaths , many apparently innocent 
civilians, and the Maoists have killed 125 people, many of 
these also civilians. There is no new military strategy to deal 
with the insurgency, and the chances of developing a viable 
political strategy, without which any military operations 
cannot be effective, have been further reduced. 
Although the international response to the coup has been 
firm to date and has forced the king to reconsider some of 
his actions, the questions of restoring democracy and tack-
ling the insurgency have not been addressed. 
Only when a broad-based strategy can be agreed on and 
implemented by all democratic political forces in Kathman-
du will talks with the Maoists be possible that stand any 
chance of success. But without further strong .international 
pressure, the king will continue to entrench his power at 
the expense of democracy, and Nepal will continu~ to suffer 
from devastating conflict. 
To find out more about the crisis in Nepal, visit our Nepal 
advocacy page. This page has details of Crisis Group's reports 
and opinion pieces on the conflict, details of our advocacy ef-
forts to date, information on what you can do to support Crisis 
Group's efforts , and links to other resources on the conflict. 
6 May 2005 
[UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, and UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan] 
In February 2005, I wrote to you to urge joint action on Ne-
pal to avert the risk of a worsening conflict in the wake of King 
Gyanendra's takeover of power. Under international pressure, the 
king set himself a deadline of one hundred days to restore order 
and lay out a road map for democracy and peace. The deadline 
passes on ll May and to date there has only been limited progress 
towards these aims. 
There have been some steps forward. The agreement on moni-
toring by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights may help 
reduce the many civilian victims of the conflict and end the climate 
of impunity. And the state of emergency has been lifted, although 
many restrictions remain. But Nepal is no closer to peace, and is 
a long way from restoring even the semblance of democracy that 
existed before: 
• The intensification of the conflict has been dramatic, with 
death rates doubling: at least 655 people were killed from l Febru-
ary to 30 April. State security forces were responsible for 530 of 
these deaths, many apparently innocent civilians, while the 125 
people killed by the Maoists included many civilian victims of 
bombs and landmines. 
• There is no new military strategy to deal with the insurgency. 
The RNA remains an ineffective fighting force largely confined to 
defensive deployment in urban areas. The army has clone nothing 
to re-establish a government presence across Nepal's countryside, 
most of which remains under the sway of the Maoists. 
• The chances of developing a viable political strategy, without 
which any military operations cannot be effective, have been fur-
ther reduced. The king's major aim appears to have been to attack 
moderate political parties and civil society--the very groups which 
were most vocally critical of the Maoists. 
• Statements by the king and his ministers have paid lip service to 
democracy but their actions point to a determined entrenchment of 
royal power. The appointment of local and regional administrators 
answerable directly to the palace, the public support for the coup by 
the nominally independent Chief justice of the Supreme Court and 
the continued attacks on freedom of speech are designed to shore up 
the king at the expense of representative parties. 
Crisis Group welcomes the firm international response to the 
coup. The suspension of military aid, accompanied by the cancel-
lation of some budgetary support and rev iews of other assistance, 
has forced the king to reconsider some of hi s actions. 
However, the questions of restoring democ racy and tackling the 
insurgency have not been addressed. 1vleasures such as the lifting 
of the emergency and announcement of municipal elections will 
not in themselves change the reality of absolute palace rule. The 
lack of a viable strategy to deal with the lvlaoist challenge will con-
tinue to be debilitating, especially given the political polarisation 
and mistrust in Kathmandu. 
Crisis Group believes that the steps outlined in our briefing 
paper Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, published on 24 
February 2005 (forwarded to you under separate cover, and also 
accessible on our website, www.crisisgroup.org) still offer a way 
to consolidate democracy and rebuild the key state institutions: 
the foundation s of a broad-based political, security and socio-eco-
nomic strategy that would address not only the insurgency but also 
the underlying issues that have fuelled it. Only when such a strat-
egy can be agreed on and implemented by all democratic political 
forces in Kathmandu will talks with the Maoists be possible that 
stand any chance of success. 
Concerted ac tion by India, the United States, the United King-
dom and the United Nations could turn around the situat ion and 
reduce the dangers of the Maoists mak ing further ga ins. \"1./e urge 
you, accordingly, to : 
• estab li sh a contact group that would appoint an intermediary 
to negoti ate a return to democracy and the participation in govern-
ment or the main political parties; 
• maintain restrictions on military aiel until the king has re-
established democracy and, together with the parties, developed a 
political plan to tackle the Maoists; and 
• ensure that the UNHCHR mission moves ahead rapidly with 
full international support. 
The king's deadline is an opportunity to fo cus attention again on 
this serious conOict. 
Gareth Evans, President 
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an indepen-
dent, non-profit , multinational organisation covering over 50 
cri sis-affected countries and territories across four continents, 
working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to 
prevent and resolve deadly conOict. 
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are imately bonded to the Himalayan landscape. 
From the lowland jungles of the Terai to the 
remote high altitude zones, Nepal is a land of 
incredibly rich ecological and cultural diversity, 
exotic wildlife and vibrant spirituality. The Journey 
to High Asia calendar explai ns Nepal in photos and 
text for 2006. 
Pre-Order Your Copy Today! 
Journey to High Asia NEPAL 2006: Order Now! 
Please send me calendars . Retail price is $13.95 each. USPS Media Mail 
shipping is included for US addresses, and calendars will be shipped by Fall 2005 . 
Quantity pricing and other sltipping rates avai lable, contact hrb@pdx.edu for information. 
Total cost of calendars: $ _______ _ 
Tax-deductible donation: $ _______ _ THANK YOU' 
Total enclosed: $ _______ _ 
Please ship calendars to: Name:-----------------
Address: ----------------
City, State, Zip:----- ---------
Please make check or money order payable to ' ANHS' and mail to: 
ANHS - Department of Geography 
Portland State University 
Box 75 1 Portland , OR 97207-075 1 
Bus Crowd in Ka thmandu 
AR-
WfSTERN 
Darchula 
Bajhang 
Bar tadi Mugu 
Bajura 
_ ... 'l,,t>~v<o' Jumla 
Q'?-"' - Doli - Achhaml Kalikot -
0 
I 
0 
50 
50 
1 
Oai lekh Jajarkol 
Surkhel 
Salyan 
100 lon 
100 mi 
MID-
~STERN 
I 
Dolpa 
Rukum 
Rolpa 
B - Bhaklapur 
I< - l<athmandu 
L - Lalilpur 
0- Okhaldhunga 
P - Parbat 
T - Tehrathum 
d"slrld bouodarle.§ $01.KCB- http:JN.·,·.w merC')-wtpS orGfpdlslmap_ll.pdf (02n0:"5) 
STE-RN 
D 
D 
D 
1ase I 
1ase II 
has Ill 
AL 
PHOTO: j OHN LI NDSEY 
(24 distnctc;) 
(15 districts) 
(36 district ) 
r 
e ecca Ht'.a rt.•,"e'I. AlmS Clrtogropher 
Un ited Na tions Na tional Development Program (UNDP) es timates of security r isk to donors by di strict. Phase I indica tes moderately secure, 
Phase II indica tes moderate security problems , and Ph ase Ill indicates areas of greatest ri sk (quoted by the World Bank, 2004) . 
ADAPTED BY B ECCA HEARTWELL 
